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Abstract 
This artic1e presents a game theoretic institutional analysis ofbureaucratic corruption: bribery 
in Chinese enterprise licensing. Fonnal structures and infonnal expectations are identified as 
features of "institutional design" that shape choices by strategic individuals to produce 
corrupt outcomes. Bribery (as an equilibrium) is deductively derived as a solution in a 
signaling game; the game fonn is empirically derived from features of institutional design. 
Exercises in comparative statics explore the robustness ofbribery as an equilibrium \vhen 
game parameter values are altered to reflect changes in institutional design. The exercises 
indicate that reducing corruption, in the sense of reducing bribe sizes, is relatively 
unproblelnatic. To lnove a\vay entirely from coπupt equi1ibria, ho\vever, requires far more 
dralnatic change in institutional design and may not be feasible through changes in fonnal 
structures alone. 
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BRIBERY IN CHINESE ENTERPRISE LICENSING 
1. Introduction. 
The transition from socialist planning to a more marketized economy on mainIand China，的
elsewhere, has been accompanied by the growth of economic crime and the emergence of 
new forms of political corruption (see, e.g. , Chan and Unger 1982, Liu 1983 , Forster 1985, 
Ostergaard 1986, Myers 1989, Lee 1990, Sands 1990, Ostergaard and Petersen 1991 , Liew 
1993). Indeed, political corruption -- defined here as deviation from duties of public 0伍ce to 
pursue private gain, in a manner that violates formal rules (see Nye 1967) 一 has become 
endemic, appearing as a normal practice in many di缸erent contexts. As the formal rules 
reflect where the state has drawn for itself the "normative line" between the allocative roles 
of market and nonmarket mechanisms, the study of political coπuption focuses on a key 
question in political economy: "the way in which wealth and market forces can undermine 
whatever dividing line has been fixed" (Rose-Ackerman 1978: 1-2). This article explains 
endemic corruption as the product of choices by strategic individuals optimizing in 戶口icular
contexts of formal structures and informal expectations. Put another w句， structures and 
expectations are features of "institutional design" that shape choices to produce coπupt 
outcomes 
The formal analysis of particular forms of corruption as products of particular 
institutional designs was pursued originally by Rose-Ackerman (1978) and more recen t1y by 
Shleifer and Vishny (1993) . Here, however, the analysis explicitly considers the role of 
expectations. Moreover, here the thesis is described and tested through game theoretic 
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anaIysis: corruption (as an equilibrium) is deductively derived as a solution in a game; the 
game fonn is empiricalIy derived 企om features of institutional design. 
The observation (or inference) that corruption is a nonnaI practice in a wide variety of 
contexts can be restated, in g缸ne theoretic tenns, as the fo lIowing hypothesis: corruption is 
an equilibrium solution in many different games, where the game form describes the 
institutional design of the strategic situation. This fonnulation has a number\ of advantages in 
establishing a research agenda for the study of corruption. 
First, it indicates a methodological approach that addresses a key obstacle to research 
on corruption: the inherent di伍culty of reliable measurement. Rigorous empirical 
investigation of corruption is hindered by the ilIegality (or impropriety) of corrupt actions, 
which are typicalIy hidden from public view. A game theoretic institutional approach does 
not make the evidence problem disappear. It does, however, refocus empirical work, from 
the problematic measurement of corrupt actions to the more manageable task of describing 
features of institutional design. It also refocuses analytical work，合om data manipulation to 
fonnal modeling. 
Secondly, in addition to facilitating descriptive and explanatory rigor, a game 
theoretic institutional approach lends itself to exercises in comparative statics that test the 
robustness of corruption as an equilibrium when parameter values, re f1ecting institutional 
design, are altered. This is only sensible in the context of rapid economic refonn, where new 
structural changes are formaIly adopted (if not always implemented) on a near continuous 
basis. Such exercises also have predictive (and implicitly prescriptive) value, indicating the 
possibilities and limitations for redesigning institutions through policy instruments to escape 
coπupt equilibria, if efficiency and distributional effects are considered to merit it. Finally, 
comparative statics exercises are at the same time studies in comparative institutional 
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analysis. As these exercises show the contribution of both structures and expectations, they 
explain how the same formal structures can produce different outcomes in different contexts 
of expectations, which define different cu1tures. 
This article analyzes as a game a form of routine bureaucratic corruption: bribery in 
the enterprise licensing process that takes place in Chinese government bureaus of industry 
and commerce. The bribery analyzed here has the following interesting feature, which is by 
no means peculiar to enterprise licensing. In principle, bureaucratic rules alone govem 
allocation of some good or service (here, enterprise licenses) at a predetermined small price 
to all qualified applicants. In practice, however, qualified applicants provide additional 
illegal private compensation to public 0伍cials for a standard good or service. That is, 
corrupt overpayments are made for a good or service that is not in fixed supply and to which 
the applicants are, in principle, fully entitled. 
AJthough relatively petty (compared, for example, to spectacular cases of Chinese 
official profiteering), this form of corruption is of particular political relevance. Here, 
ordinary citizens interacting normally with government officiaIs act as accomplices of corrupt 
officials in sustaining bribery as a usual practice. This involvement of citizens in the routine 
deviation of state functionaries from the 印les the state has set for itself undermines both 
those who rule and rules generally: it reinforces a view that the regime is incapable of 
governing itself, much less its citizens, and it impedes the fragile development of a norm of 
law. 
I begin below by identifying in more detail the characteristics of bribery in enterprise 
licensing. I follow with an empirical description of enterprise licensing in terms of its key 
institutional features. I then formalize the description in a model of enterprise licensing as a 
signaling game and go on to pursue an explanatory aim by deriving the conditions for which 
3 
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bribery constitutes an equilibrium solution (and the equilibrium bribe size). 1 illustrate the 
solution with a numerical example, using plausible values for game parameters. The game 
and example are the point of departure for an analysis of the value of personal connections in 
obtaining an enterprise license and for exercises in comparative statics, which explore the 
robustness of bribery as an equilibrium when parameter values are altered to reflect changes 
in institutional design. The comparative statics exercises allow me to make Some predictive 
statements about the effects of recent policy changes and ongoing anti-corruption efforts on 
the form of corruption analyzed here. 
My understanding of formal institutional design features of enterprise licensing is 
based mainly on 0伍cial sources. The most important of these are officials interviewed at the 
State Administration of Industry and Commerce (SAIC), officials interviewed at licensing 
offices in local bureaus of industry and commerce, and documents and local repo口s in the 
.. SAlC departmental journal 
As noted above, the illicit character of corruption frustrates effo口s at rigorous 
empl討cal measurement of corrupt transactions. 1 considered it useful nonetheless to do some 
empirical investigation into the dependent variable. To this end, 1 conducted unofficial 
interviews with Chinese entrepreneurs who had licensed enterprises since the mid-1980s. 
These sources supplemented official accounts with information about informal dimensions of 
enterprise licensing and also provided some empirical basis for the discussion of expectations 
relevant to bribery in enterprise licensing. 
2. Bribery in Chinese ~nterprise Licensing. 
Chinese economic reforms in the 1980s, which transformed managerial incentives in the state 
sector and promoted expansion of the non-state sector, Ied to the emergence of many new 
enterprises and new forms of ownership and management. The number of registered 
4 
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domestic enterprises in the collective sector grew rapidly 一企om 1.5 millionin 1981 t04.2 
million in 1992. A significant domestic private sector re-emerged: registered individual 
enterprises grew from 1. 8 million in 1981 to 15.3 million in 1992; larger private enterprises 
emerged in the mid-1980s, with about 140 thousand registered private enterprises in 
operation in 1992 (Zhongguo gongshang xingzheng guanli tongji sishi nian 1992:3, 164; 
Zhongguo gongshang xingzheng guanli nianjian 1993:531 , 555, 559). At tþe same time, 
existing enterprises in the state and collective sectors expanded, adapted, or diversified to 
encompass new production and business lines. 
All industrial and commercial ejl加pTises in mainland China require government 
authorization to engage in production or business activity. New enterprises require licenses 
to obtain legal status for their economic activity, and changes in the economic activity of 
existing enterprises require authorization through changes of license. The government 
department assigned to this task is the SAlC. 1 
Tÿpically, enterprise licenses authorizing specified economic activity are obtained at 
licensing offices in the SAlC's subordinate bureaus of industry and commerce located 
throughout the country. A recent Chinese study of corruption identifies these local bureaus 
as among a hand加 of government departments in which most bureaucratic corruption is 
concentrated (Gong 1991 :8-9).2 Repo討s on corruption witrun bureaus of industry and 
commerce cite enterprise licensing as one of a few areas in wruch abuses of public 0伍ce and 
violations of law and discipline are common (see, e.g. , SAlC, Investigation Group 1986~ 
SAlC 23 July 1988, 4 Sept. 1990~ Liu 1990, 1993). 
Corruption in enterprise licensing typically takes the form of bribery by applicants for 
enterprise licenses. Payments may be cash or non-cash gifts or favors. Published Chinese 
repo口s on co汀uption in enterprise licensing discuss pa戶nents of illicit fees ("goodwill fees," 
5 
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"processing fees," "personal commissions," "tea fees") and undisguised cash bribes to 
individual 0伍cials， as well as personalloans, gifts, and invitations to dinner. To this list 
entrepreneurs interviewed added payments of shares in enterprises and a variety of services 
such as photocopying, use of private vehicles, installation of residential telephones, 
assistance in school placement for children, and household repairs. According to 
entrepreneurs interviewed, such transactions can also take place aaer applicpnts and o伍cials
have established personal connections, apa此企om the formal relationship defined by 
allocation of enterprise licenses. 
/ 
Reports from anti-corruption campaigns (whatever their bias) indicate that bribe 
amounts vary widely. For example, in 1985 and 1986, a campaign in a district bureau in 
Xi'an resu1ted in over a hundred reported refusals of gifts and cash bribes totalling over 
11 ,000 yuan (SAlC, Investigation Group 1986). Over a period of a few months in 1989, a 
campaign in a Beijing district bureau resulted in about the same number of repo巾d refusals, 
but the total amount came to only about 6,000 yuan (Ma 1990). 1n 1988 through 1990, 
campaigns in twelve provinces resulted in 155 ,000 repo口ed refusals of gifts and bribes 
totalling about ten million yuan, including individual cases of bribes in amounts over 10,000 
yuan (Liu 1990). Exchanges completed and unreported are probably higher yet: for example, 
one licensing official in Nantong (Jiangsu province) used his position to "borrow" a total of 
220,000 yuan from six different enterprises (Zhongguo gongshang bao 26 Mar. 1992:2). 
A11 of the transactions noted above are officially defined as acts of impropriety that 
clearly violate disciplinary standards set out in SAIC regulations (SAlC 23 July 1988, 20 
Mar. 1990). According to Chinese criminallaw, most such transactions are also illega1. 1n a 
discussion ofthe Iaws on bribery and their interpretation in the courts, Sun (1990 :4 7-6月
identifies the substitution of material private interests for the public interest as the key 
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harmful feature of bribe巾， which harms the "normal functioning of the bureaucracy" and the 
"reputation of state functionaries." Consequent1y, the courts consider the question of specific 
economic loss to the state or specific social harm as immaterial to a dete口nination that an 
action constitutes bribery. A1so immaterial is whether or not transactions involve those with 
whom officials have personal connections and whether or not benefits sought are in fact 
obtained.3 
The law defines the crime of accepting a bribe as: "any action by a state functionary 
.. . to exact material gain or accept inappropriate (bu zhengdang) material gain from an 
individual for exploiting the resources of public office to seek benefits for that individual." 
In addition, "receipt in any guise of a personal commission or processing fee by a state 
functionary in the course of an economic transaction and in violation of state regulations" is 
considered as accepting a bribe. Offering a bribe is also a crime, defined as: "offering 
material gain to a state functionary ... for actions that exploit the resources of public office to 
seek inappropriate benefits" (Sixth National People's Congress, Standing Committee 21 Jan. 
1988:34, 36) 
These definitions are interesting for their implications about the costs ofbribery. For 
officials, accepting an offer of inappropriate material gain to exploit public office to seek 
benefits for an individual constitutes the crime of accepting a bribe; for applicants, however, 
precisely such an offer is not a crime unless the benefits sought are themselves inappropriate. 
The law is quite specific on this point . If an individual is "compelled by a state functionary ... 
to give some material payment and no inappropriate benefits are obtained, this does not 
constitute the crime of offering a bribe" (Sixth National People's Congress, Standing 
Committee 21 Jan. 1988:36). Sun (1990:64) elaborates on these circumstances: 
7 
Corruption by Design 
The benefit sought is not il1egal. Rather, it is not only pem世tted by law and 
regulations, but also the individual is fully entit1ed to it. But because state 
functionaries do not perfonn their duties responsibly or are deliberately 
obstructive and coercive, the individual entit1ed to the benefit is faced with 
delay in obtaining it or di伍cu1ty in obtaining it. . The individual is driven to no 
other alternative but to offer a bribe, contrary to his convictions. This act 
lacks the deliberate purpose of offering a bribe. ... If an individual finds 
himself compelled to offer material gain to a public official in order to obtain 
a benefit to which he is entitled, this is not a crime of offering a bribe. 
The fonn of bribery analyzed here is only very subtly distinct from these 
circumstances. To avoid costly delays, applicants may make corrupt overpayments to 
licensing officials for enterprise licenses to which they are fully entitled. In making such 
payments, however, applicants do not know whether the bribes are overpayments or 
reasonable fees for valuable illicit services. This important feature of bribery in enterprise 
licensing is explained below, as a product ofthe institutional design of licensing 
3. Institutional Design of Enterprise Licensing. 
The Chinese government has not set explicit limits or targets aimed at achieving some 
optimal number of enterprises or otherwise fixed the supply of enterprise licenses. 4 In 
pnnclp泊， enterprise licensing is simply authorization to engage in specific economic activity 
and registration ofbasic information about enterprises. Nonetheless, in the context ofthe 
economic refonns, enterprise licensing has been no simple matter of enterprise registration. 
3.1. Jnformation A矽n1metry.
Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, official stipulations for acceptable enterprise license 
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applications great1y increased in number and specificity. Relevant laws, regulations, rules, 
measures, notices, and opinions were periodically revised or revoked to reflect changes in 
economic policy orientation. One resu1t of all this is a situation of extreme information 
asymmetry that can be summarized as follows: at the time they submit applications to 
licensing officials, applicants usually do not know whether or not their materials meet the 
standards defining acceptable applications, but 0伍cials do know. 
Because enterprise licensing was not well estab!ished in the pre-reform period, 
official stipulations defining acceptable applications for enterprise licenses are all fairly 
recent. An initial set of regulations on enterprise licensing was issued in 1982. By 1992 the 
government and its departments had issued over 130 documents on enterprise licensing 
(SAIC 1nterview 92121) .5 Many stipulations are general to all enterprises: all applicants are 
required to complete standardized application forms and submit documentation on financial 
resources, place of production or business, eligible employees, and prior examination and 
approval by the government departments that have authority over the trades or industrial 
sectors of the proposed enterprise economic activities. There are also stipulations about 
acceptable enterprise names and acceptable designations of form and scope of enterprise 
econornic activities . 1n addition, local governments, local bureaus of industry and commerce, 
and other local government departments issue their own stipulations on enterprise licensing. 
A great many other requirements are defined for specific types of products and 
enterprises. These requirements are met by obtaining permits 丘om vanous government 
departments -- including departments of city planning, public health, environmental 
protection, and (for some designated "special trades") public security. The greatest number 
of required perrnits are those issued by government economic departments associated with 
the planned economy. 1n late 1992, applicants for enterprises could require 200 or more 
9 
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pennits prior to submitting applications to licensing 。但ces. Requirements exceeding 100 
pennits were not uncommon (SAIC 1nterview 92121). 
A strict adherence to these 。但cia1 stipulations creates incentives for otherwise Iegal 
economic activities and enterprises to go unlicensed and, therefore, unmonitored by the 
department established specificalIy for these purposes. Moreover, standards communicated 
in government documents re f1ect economic policy at the time they are formulated and issued 
-- and almost as soon as standards began be formalized in the early 198郎， IocaI bureaus of 
industry and commerce found that their specific content Iagged behind subsequent changes in 
economic policy orientation. An early articIe in the SAIC journaI asked: what ought local 
officials to do when what appears to be reasonable is not strictly IegaI, and vice versa? 1t 
concIuded that regulations not conforming to the "new situation" of economic reform ought 
not necessarily to be observed (Fan 1984). 
Leading officiaIs in the SAIC have tended to agree with this view. They noted in 
interviews that local bureaus of industry and commerce are required in principle to license 
enterprises in accordance with SAIC regulatioñs. 1n practice, however, the SAIC has 
permitted the bureaus to ignore some regulations because of "the contradiction between the 
oId and new systems." The criterion used to evaluate Iocal implementation is not officiaI 
standards but "concrete results," mainly as these relate to economic policy orientation (SAIC 
Interviews 93081 and 93082). 
Not surprisingly, then, officiaI stipulations on enterprise licensing do not re f1 ect 
operative standards communicated to licensing officials by leaders in locallicensing offices. 
1n practice, at least some (and after 1992 a great many) stipulations are selectively waived .6 
Through channels such as office meetings and organized study of 0伍cial documents, leaders 
in Iocallicensing offices communicate to subordinate officials in charge of evaluating license 
10 
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applications what is "really required" and what is "not important to fuss about" (Licensing 
0伍ce Interview 92121). 
It is clear 企om published accounts and interviews with entrepreneurs that applicants 
are normally unfamiliar with the various 0伍cial and operative standards that define 
acceptable applications for enterprise licenses (see, e.g., Fang 1991; Wan 1992). Documents 
that contain 0伍cial stipulations are not easily accessible.7 Both official and 9perative 
standards are too many, too detailed, and too frequentIy changing to be mastered by 
outsiders. Indeed, according to a leading SAIC official, it is practically impossible for 
anyone without considerable experience inside the system to know what is realIy required to 
Iicense an enterprise (SAIC Interview 93082). As a result, applicants submit applications 
they know cannot meet the stringent and largely unfamiliar 0伍cial standards, although they 
do not know whether or not they meet operative standards. 
3.2. Evaluation 01 Applications as th叫你的 Locus 01 Bri bely. 
The SAIC does not dictate to IocaI bureaus of industry and commerce internal bureaucratic 
procedures. Procedures va句， therefore, across Iicensing 0伍ces (and also over time). Four 
basic sequential procedures are pa討 of enterprise Iicensing in all offices, however. They are: 
initial evaluation of application materials to determine their acceptability, investigation and 
verification of materials to determine their validity, approval of enterprise licenses, and issue 
of licenses. According to leaders at locallicensing offic的， evaluation of application 
materials is the most important and demanding of these administrative tasks. It is the only 
position that brings licensing officials into routine contact with applicants. Not surprisingly, 
it is the main locus of bribery in enterprise licensing. 
Evaluation of application materials requires officials to apply and explain standards. 
0臼cials responsible for evaluation are supposed to possess a thorough knowledge of formal 
11 
Corruption by D臼ign，
and operative standards for acceptable applications and be able to exercise bureaucratic 
discretion responsibly. Temporary personnel are not assigned to this position, and (barring 
discovery of irregularities) rotation of officials assigned to this position is uncommon. 
Locallicensing 0伍ces have territorialIy-based monopolies on issuing licenses for 
enterprises in their localities. Officials in charge of evaluation of application materials can 
also enjoy a monopoly: in large licensing 0伍ces， individual 0伍cials often specialize in 
applications for pa口icular forms of enterprise (organized by territorial scope of operation, 
ownersrup sector, or economic activity). 1n smalIer offices, applicants in a single queue 
usually present themselves to officials on a first-come-first-served basis. 
Reports 丘om local bureaus of industry and commerce rationalize specialization in 
terms of e伍ciency gains, but acknowledge the greater opportunities for bribery inherent in 
monopoly power. The sequential organization of licensing procedures is supposed to check 
these opportunities: to promote cIean government through mutual monitoring in licensing 
(see, e.g. , Kong 1990; Zhang 1990; Dalian MunicipaIity, Jinzhou District Bureau of1ndustry 
and Cornmerce 1991; Hunan Province, Hengyang Municipal Bureau of 1ndustry and 
Commerce, Office of Supervision 1992). Acceptance of application materials 泊， therefore, 
routinely followed by investigation and verification of materials by a different set of 
licensing 0伍cials. 1n the past few years, licensing offices have reduced investigation and 
verification requirements and substituted more stringent post-licensing inspection of 
ente叩rises . To the extent that investigation and verification (or inspection) procedures are 
thorough and legitimate, these arrangements provide checks on officials who evaluate 
application materials.8 A third procedure -- approval -- can act as a further check. But 
approval usually issues from the licensing office head (or deputy head), who has many other 
responsibilities too and is unlikely to turn up any but the most obvious inadequacies. 
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Investigation and verification, approva], and inspection follow evaluation and 
acceptance of materials. Such checks as these later procedures provide are absent, therefore, 
if application materials are rejected: the application process is provisionally terminated if 
materials are evaluated as unacceptable. Some licensing 0伍ces requlre 0伍cials to provide 
applicants with written explanations with rejected applications, to avoid misunderstandings 
about what is required to bring applications up to standard. Even so, no ro~tine mechanism 
exists to monitor r司 ections. F or the most pa此， decisions to r只ject applications are 
independent, unmonitored, and final. 9 
3.3. Expected Costs of Rejected Applicatiol1s. 
When licensing 0伍cials evaluate and r貝ject applications, they indicate to applicants what 
changes or additional materials are required. In principle, acceptance is always attainable --
but not necessarily at first try. Rejected applications are associated with di丘erent expected 
costs for applicants and officials. 
Consider first the cost to applicants of making changes or obtaining the additional 
approvals, permits, or other materials in which (officials signal) their applications are 
deficient. 10 This process of revising (and resubmitting) application materials can consume 
great amounts of time. Entrepreneurs 1 interviewed consider imposition of time costs as the 
greatest discretionary power licensing 0伍cials possess. In their view, bureaucratic standards 
provide officials with many possible reasons to reject applications and impose time costs. 
These are also the costs entrepreneurs most want to avoid paying. It is difficu1t to estimate 
how long the process of revising will take (estimates ranged from several months to a year) 
and how exacting licensing officials will be in evaluating revised applications. For 
entrepreneurs, time is critical (as one commented: "time is money"), because 10st time can 
mean lost market opportunities. 
13 
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When entrepreneurs comment that licensing 0伍cials can reject applications more or 
less at will and stall acceptance for a long time, this ref1ects beliefs about low expected costs 
to 0伍cials of rejecting applications. These beliefs are consistent with the 企amework of 
monitoring and incentives within which licensing officials actually work. Officials incur no 
costs in "r貝jecting applications that are by operative standards unacceptable: this is doing their 
job. Rejecting applications that are in fact acceptable is not similarly cost1es戶， but because 
the probability of detecting rejections and the pena1ties imposed if detected are both quite 
low, the expected costs of吋ecting acceptable applications are low 
The question of penalties is straightforward. For reasons discussed in section 3.1 
above, applications for enterprise licenses are unlikely at first try (or indeed ever) strictly to 
meet 0伍cial standards of acceptability. While applications are more likely to meet operative 
standards, the continued existence of st巾gent official standards allows 0丘icials to reject 
applications at relatively low cost. These standards are a resource that can be exploited in 
rejecting applications: if detected，。伍cials who reject acceptable applications are overly 
strict, but not obviously arbitrary. Penalties may be imposed for bureaucratic workstyle, but 
these are unlikely to be very serious. 11 
Moreover, rejections of acceptable applications are unlikely to be detected at al1. As 
discussed above, only applications that have been accepted are sent on for further 
consideration by other licensing 0伍cials. 1n addition, because enterprise licensing is a 
territorial monopoly (and, if there is specialization, a monopoly within individuallicensing 
offices), there is no implicit monitoring through competition. Un1ess they choose to locate in 
a different locality, entrepreneurs whose applications have been rejected cannot try at another 
licensing office to obtain a second opinion. When evaluation procedures are not specialized 
by type of enterprise, allowing applicants to choose among licensing officials, entrepreneurs 
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whose applications are rejected are apparently nonetheless un1ikely to obtain a reversal from 
co-workers in the 0伍ce. One entrepreneur explained this as follows: "These people work in 
the same 0伍ce day after day, their relationship is an ongoing one. They would not want to 
do anything to upset this relationship. ... 1 am on1y someone who comes in for a license, 1 am 
not someone at work. So if one 0伍cial says something, the other does not contradict it" 
(Entrepreneur Interview 93074). 
There is a formal administrative appeaIs process that applicants can take up ifthey 
believe 0伍cials have acted improperly in rejecting applications for enterprise Iicenses (see 
SAlC 20 July 1990). F or a number of reasons, however, applicants are unlikely to resort to 
formal appeaIs. To begin with, applicants do not know whether or not their applications are 
acceptable. This means that applicants who choose the appeals process do so without 
certainty that their complaint is valid , but with certainty that official standards are on the side 
ofthe officia1. Further, the appeals process does not expedite applications: waiting for the 
appropriate office to complete an investigation (and perhaps conclude with a confirmation of 
the rejection) is not an attractive choice for entrepreneurs who value time highly. 
Administrative appeals are unappealing for another reason too. Entrepreneurs 1 
interviewed consider complaints 一 especially formal complaints -- a poor strategy, because: 
"you and this system will be in contact for a long time after you start up your enterprise," and 
"the relationship with the bureau of industry and commerce is very important ll (Entrepreneur 
Interview 92123). Enterprises are required to submit annuaI repo口s and pay annuaI fees to 
licensing offices. They are required to reIicense if there are changes in ownership, location, 
or economic activity. Licensing new enterprises may be a one-time encounter between 
applicants and pa口icular licensing officiaIs, but the relationship between enterprises and 
licensing 0伍ces (and bureaus of industry and commerce) is an ongoing one. 
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Finally, if licensing 0伍cials act improperly in rejecting applications, there is always 
the possibility that they operate in an environment in which such actions are protected, 
accepted, or at least not actively resisted by localleaders. In such cases, investigation of 
appeals is unlikely to meet with success. I take up this issue in greater detail below, in a 
、 discussion of sanctions against bribery. 
3.4. Expected Costs 01 Bribery. 
Bribery is an a1ternative to revising and resubmitting applications after they are rejected. The 
bribe per se is a cost for applicants and a benefit for officials. In addition to the bribe, there 
are expected ë-os~ associated with bribery. These reflect the probability of detection and 
L一~→----/
sanctions if dete_cted. Expected costs ofbribery are relevant to both applicants and 0伍cials ，
a1though they differ in value. They also depend significantly on whether or not applications 
are in fact acceptable. Licensing officials can normally be expected to reject applications that 
do not meet operative standards of acceptability. But officials seeking bribes may also reject 
acceptable applications. 
Consider the expected costs to applicants. 1f their applications are in fact acceptable, 
then the probability that bribery will be detected is low: if applications are acceptable, then 
investigation, verification, approval , and inspection procedures will reveal no basis for an 
illicit exchange and raise no suspicions. Further, if applications are acceptable, bribe offers 
are not unambiguously bribery in the legal sense. 1f the bribery is detected, the basic 
acceptability of the rejected applications offers applicants the oppo討unity to claim "no other 
aIternative but to offer a bribe." 1n such circumstances, bribe 0任ers do 'not constitute a crime 
of offering a bribe (Sun 1990:64). 1n sum, if rejected applications are acceptable, applicants 
are likely to incur no costs beyond the bribe per se. 
Both the probability of detection and penalties if detected are higher for applicants if 
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their applications are unacceptable. In such circumstances, bribe offers constitute bribery in 
the legal sense. The crime ofbribery is discussed in the Criminal Law (Fifth National 
People's Congress 1 July 1979) and in c1ari令ring documents (see especially Fifth National 
People's Congress, Standing Committee 8 Mar. 1982; Sixth National People's Congress, 
Standing Committee 21 Jan. 1988; Supreme People's Court and Supreme People's 
procuratorate6Nov. 1989). For ofrering a bribe, Chinese criminal law speqiEes sanctions 
rangmg 企ornforced labotorA ErisOTImerltfortems ofup to fiveyearsto life Longprison 
terms are for "serious circumstances" or circumstances of "serious loss to the state and 
collective interest." But none of the c1arifications by Sun (1990: 56-5月 suggest that b討bery
to induce licensing officials to accept unacceptable applications falls under the category of 
serious circumstances. Moreover, published Chinese accounts of bribery cases suggest that 
applicants \vho offer bribes are treated very leniently unless they commit other crimes as 
wel1. 12 
F or licensing officials, accepting bribes 一 regardless of whether applications are 
acceptable or unacceptable -- meets the legal definition of bribery. If the bribery is detected 
(which is more likely ifthe application is unacceptable), legal and administrative sanctions 
apply. Sanctions against officials who accept bribes depend on the extent of harm caused by 
the bribery and the bribe size. Officials who accept bribes of 10,000 yuan or more can be 
imprisoned for life~立竺些e the death pena1ty. For accepting smaller bribes, officials can be 
sentenced to forced labor or imprisonment for up to seven years. In "serious circumstances," 
this sentence can be increased to ten years; in "rninor circumstances," it can be reduced or 
waived altogether and administrative disciplinary sanctions by the government substituted. 
Sun (1990 : 56-5月 cites as "serious circumstances": bribery causing great harm to the state or 
co l1ective interest, violation of law:; io addition to bribery, participation in a bribery c1ique, 
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企equent acceptance of bribes, soliciting bribes, re丘lsal to confess after bribery is discovered, 
bribery involving citizens of foreign countries, and bribery involving nationa1 treasures. 
Examples of "minor circumstances" are small bribes and situations where officials tum 
themselves in, show remorse, and take the initiative to return bribes. "Minor circumstances" 
also include those in which 0伍cials are 忽li1ty of on1y "an ordinary travesty of justice" (yiban 
Z仰的) that violates government regulations but no law 
If circumstances of bribery are minor，。伍cials may be sanctioned with government 
administrative disciplinary measures . These are clearly set out in State Council regulations 
(see especially 13 Sept. 1988) and SAIC regulations (see especially 20 Mar. 1990). There are 
eight grades of administrative discipline: warning, record of error, record of major error, 
demotion of rank, demotion of office, dismissal 丘om office, expulsion from cadre ranks with 
probation, expulsion from cadre ranks. The SAIC regulations do not speci令 specific
measures for specific violations, but recommend sanctions take into account the seriousness 
of the violation and the official's attitude toward his misconduct. They suggest, for example, 
demotion of rank, demotion of offi白) or dismissal from office in "fairly serious 
circumstances," where the official has not reformed himself and the consequences of the 
violation have been bad. 
A repo口 (Tu 1991) on obstacles to clean government in bureaus of industry and 
commerce indicates that officials assigned to implement measures on clean government often 
themselves accept "social trends" such as bribery and do not seriously attempt to resist 
routine violations. It notes too that conscientious officials face great interference from 
bureau leaders, who oppose investigation of abuses of power because they believe it harms 
the reputation of the bureaus. Officials investigating violations have been subject to 
discrimination in career oppo口unities . In more extreme cases, they have been threatened and 
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beaten. 
Penalties actual1y meted out to licensing officials for accepting bribes can be very 
light. The Nantong official who "borrowed" 220,000 yuan was obliged to retum the money 
and a major error was recorded in his file (Zhongguo gongshang bao 26 Mar. 1992:2). The 
SAIC journal reported as a positive example the Zhuhai municipal bureau of industry and 
commerce experience: in the period 企om 1982 to 1991 , a district bureau had dismissed on1y 
three 0伍cials for accepting bribes (Guangdong Province, Zhuhai Municipal Bureau of 
Industry and Commerce 1991). Anti-corruption measures adoptedby a licensing 0伍ce ln a 
Shaanxi county were also reported as an example: 0伍cials discovered to have received gifts 
or accepted invitations to dinner were required to confess publicly and give up their monthly 
bonus, but they incurrèd no administrative pena1ties unless they had accepted cash bribes of 
300 )心an or more. Nor were they rotated out oftheir (lucrative) positions in the licensing 
office unless they had accepted larger cash bribes (Shaanxi Province, Mei County Bureau of 
Industry and Commerce 1990) 
In considering expected costs of bribe句， the discussion above presumes that bribes 
offered are accepted, which is equivalent to presuming that no 0伍cials refuse bribes. But 
included in expected costs to applicants of offering bribes is some cost associated with 
attempting to bribe 0缸icials who do not accept bribes. Presumably, these costs are fairly low: 
applicants can make bribe offers sufficiently ambiguous to back away from them should 
。伍cials not respond positively; corrupt officials may signal informally that rejected 
applications can be accepted without revisions. Nonetheless, signals can be misinterpreted. 
Clean 0伍cials may refuse bribe offers and simply require applicants to revise and resubmit, 
in accordance with their formal signal of r司ection . But they may also respond to bribe offers 
more negatively. For example, they may adopt a more bureaucratic workstyle in reviewing 
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resubmitted applications or may repo口 bribe offers. Expected costs of offering bribes 
include, then, costs associated with attempting to bribe clean officials. 
3.5. Priorsfor Encountering Clean Officials. 
Prior to submitting their applications to licensing officials, entrepreneurs already have some 
notions about how these officials are likely to act. These are beliefs about whether or not the 
。伍cials they encounter will mislead them about the status of appIications, arbitrarily reject 
applications as unacceptable, and accept bribes in exchange for reversing rejections of 
applications. 1 summarize these beliefs as priors about the Iikelihood of encountering clean 
officials. 
In a repo口 on cIean government (Liu 1990), the SAIC head acknowledged a poor 
public image of officials working at basic levels of the system, but indicated that the situation 
had improved since the mid-1980s. He cited (without explanation) figures from Henan 
province on the proportion of personnel who violate laws and discipline in the administration 
of industry and commerce: that proportion had dropped from more than 10 percent before 
1985 to about half a percent by 1990. Whatever the basis for these figures (i .e ., whether they 
reflect detected violations or estimated actual violations), both are probably too optimistic. 
Judging from interviews with entrepreneurs, applicants typically estimate as low (below, 
perhaps well below, 0.5 percent) the probability of encountering clean licensing officials 
Entrepreneurs interviewed also expressed beliefs about actions of other applicants . 
When asked about the proportion of applicants who foIIow the application process from 
beginning to end without bribery, entrepreneurs repIied that "most," "everyone," or "over 
half' resort to some form of bribelγ. These beliefs about what others are doing suppo此 low
priors for encountering clean licensing officials: a beliefthat most other applicants are 
offering bribes for licenses implies a belief that bribery in enterprise licensing is a usual 
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practlce. 
Some entrepreneurs 1 interviewed conceded that there were undoubtedly some honest 
and efficient officials. Yet, although leaders of locallicensing 。由ces describe their 0伍ces
as service-oriented, entrepreneurs do not generally seem to view them as such. They 
described a bureaucracy with practically no norm of servi伐， in which officials typically must 
see some "advantage" (haochu) before they will do their jobs. Given this conception, 
applicants do not approach officials expecting service, much less asserting it as a right. One 
entrepreneur observed: "Very rarely will you see someone go into the bureau of industry and 
commerce and be demanding, with the notion that he is entitled to start up an enterprise and 
the bureau of industry and commerce has a job to license him" (Entrepreneur Interview 
93074). Applicants approach officials as supplicants, knowing that goodwiIl is required and 
believing that goodwill is not dispensed free of charge but must be compensated privately. 
Related to the notion that service requires additional compensation is the knowledge, 
volunteered by many entrepreneurs interviewed, that licensing officials have low salaries 
relative to the applicants they encounter. 13 The basic view that officials are probably not 
efficient or honest functionaries who dispense free goodwill derives also from experiences 
with other mainland Chinese bureaucracies and a general conception of how these 
bureaucracies and their bureaucrats work. 
4. Enterprise Licensing as a Signaling Game. 
The institutional features of enterprise licensing described in detail above are the empirical 
basis for the game-theoretic analysis in this section. Enterprise licensing is modeled here as a 
multi-stage signaling game presented in extensive form. 1 derive the conditions for which 
bribery is an equilibrium in the game (and the equilibrium bribe sizes) and offer a numerical 
example using plausible game parameter values. 
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The game is a model of the procedure, identified above as an important locus of 
bribery, in which applicants submit application fonns and accompanying materials to 
licensing 0伍cials for initial evaluation and (if accepted) 如此her processing. The game fonn 
is il1ustrated in 且即re 1 and the payoff structure is summarized in table 1. (Base case values 
in table 1 are for the example at the end ofthis section.) Note that most payoffs in the game 
are costs. Most of these costs are products of the probability of detection and penalties ìf 
detected. 
4.1. Period 0: Actions by Nature. 
The game has two players. Player 1 (the 0伍cial) has one oftwo potential types: "c1ean" and 
"corrupt." Player 2 (the applicant) also has one oftwo potential types, based on the 
application he presents: "acceptable" application and "unacceptable" application. Define an 
acceptable application as one that meets the threshold for acceptance when evaluated by 
operative standards set by leaders in locallicensing offices and communicated to licensing 
officials at lower levels. Conversely, an unacceptable application is one that does not meet 
the threshold for acceptance when evaluated by these standards. 
The official has complete information: he knows with certainty both his own type and 
the applicant's type. The applicant knows neither the official's type nor his own type, but 
must estimate these based on incomplete information. Let Pl denote the applicant's estimated 
prior probability that the application is acceptable; 1 - Pl denotes the prior probability that the 
application is unacceptable. Let P2 denote the applicant's estimated prior probability that the 
official is c1ean; 1 - P2 denotes the prior probability that the official is corrupt. 
4.2. Period 1: First A ction by the Official. 
In period 1 only the 0伍cial takes an action a1. The action space has two elements: "accept" 
the application and "reject" the application. If the 0伍cial accepts the application, the game 
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ends in this period. 
The applicant has payoff 0 in this period -- whether the official accepts or rejects the 
application. This is because the game begins with the submitted application: if the official 
accepts the application, the applicant has incurred only the cost of preparing the application, 
which is prior to the game; if the 0伍cial rejects the application, the applicant incurs costs 
that depend on actions chosen in period 2 and (sometimes) in period 3. 
Payoffs to the official depend on whether or not the application is in fact acceptable. 
If the application is acceptab泊， the 0伍cial has payoff 0 if he accepts it; if the application is 
unacceptable, the official has payoff 0 if he rejects it. In both cases, the 0伍cial is doing his 
job (and payoff 0 indicates no costs) 
Define a clean official as one who always accepts acceptable applications, always 
rejects unacceptable applications, and always rejects bribes. A corrupt 0伍cial may.do 
otherwise. If the application is acceptable, the corrupt official has payoff -A1 if he rejects it. 
Trus reflects the cost of harassing a qualified applicant by r司ecting an acceptable application. 
If the application is unacceptable, the corrupt official has payoff -C1 if he accepts it. This 
reflects the cost of allowing an unqualified applicant to get through. 
From a myopic perspective, both officials prefer in period 1 to accept an acceptable 
application and reject an unacceptable application, incurring payoffs of 0 (i.e. , no costs) for 
these actions. However, a co叮upt official would prefer a bribe, which in trus game he can 
obtain only if the application is rejected in period 1.14 F or this reason, a corrupt official may 
choose to reject an acceptable application and incur a payoff of -A1 in period 1, in the 
expectation of gaining a positive payoff with a bribe later in the game. 15 
4.3. Period 2: Action by the Applicant. 
In period 2 the applicant takes an action a2 (a response to a1 "reject" in period 1). The action 
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space has two elements: offer a "bribe" to the 。但cial and "revise and resubmit" the 
application according to specificatioris set out by the official who 吋ects the application. In 
setting out these specifications, the co叮upt official evaluating an unacceptable application 
presents the applicant with costs of revising and resubmitting that approximate those of an 
unqualified applicant 
If the applicant revises and resubmits the application, the game ends because the 
official is obliged to accept it. 16 Payoffs in this period are 0 for the 。但cial. (If the 
application is in fact acceptable, the official's payoffs in the end will include the cost A1 
associated with harassment in period 1.) Payo丘S are -C2 for the applicant. This is the cost of 
revising and resubmitting the application. Ifthe applicant offers a bribe, the game continues, 
with payoffs for both players determined by the action chosen in period 3. 
4.4. Period 3: Second Action by the Official. 
In period 3 the official takes an action a3 (a response to a2 "bribe" in period 2). The action 
space has t\\'o elements: "accept" the bribe and the application and "reject" the bribe and the 
application (again) 
If the official is clean, the application is by definition unacceptable: otherwise it 
would have been accepted in period 1. The bribe and application are rejected , with payoff 0 
for the official: he is simply doing his job. The applicant has no alternative but to revise and 
resubmit the application,17 with the resuIting payoff -A2 - C2 . This reflects the costs of 
offering a bribe to a clean official and revising and resubmitting the application. 
Now consider the situation if the official is corrupt. If the corrupt 0伍cial rejects the 
bribe and the application, his payoff is 0 in this period. (Again, if the application is in fact 
acceptable, the 0伍cial's payoffs in the end include the cost A1 of harassment in period 1.) As 
above, the applicant has no altemative but to revise and resubmit the application, with 
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resulting payoff -C2, reflecting the cost of this action.
J8 
But the co汀upt 0伍cial may accept the bribe and application. His payoffs then 
depend on whether or not the application is in fact acceptable. If the application is 
acceptable, he has payoffs M - B l' This is the bribe (a benefit for the officia1) mÏnus the cost 
of accepting a bribe from a qualified applicant. 19 The applicant has payoff -~任， the bribe (a 
cost for the applicant). Ifthe application is unacceptable, the 0伍cial has payoffM - DJ. This 
is the bribe he receives mÏnus the cost of accepting a bribe and application 企oman
unqualified applicant. 20 The applicant's payoffis -M - B2' which is the bribe plus the cost of 
bribing an official to accept an unacceptable application. 
4.5. Analysis. 
The interesting question is what the applicant wilI do when his application is rejected in 
period 1. Assuming (as 1 do here) that he does not exit the bureaucratic process aItogether, 
the applicant may choose either to offer a bribe or to revise and resubmit the application. If 
he chooses to offer a bribe, he must also choose a bribe size. The applicant must make these 
choices without knowing where he is located on the game tree: after the application is 
rejected in period 1, he knows only that he has not submitted an acceptable application to a 
clean officia1. He does not know whether he has submitted an acceptable application to a 
corrupt 0伍cial (node α) ， submitted an unacceptable application to a c1ean 0伍cial (node ß), 
or subm.itted an unacceptable application to a corrupt official (node y). 
To solve for the conditions in which bribery constitutes an equilibrium, 1 follow the 
usual analytic practice of starting at the bottom of the game tree and working by backward 
induction. Starting at the bottom ofthe game tree, supposing the applicant offers a bribe, 
how big must the bribe be in order jor it and the application to be accepted? The answer 
depends on the costs to the 0伍cial of accepting the bribe. These costs vary, depending on 
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the applicant's type and the 0伍cial's type. If the applicant is at node ß, by definition no bribe 
can be big enough to tempt the official to accept it: at this node, the application is 
unacceptable and the 0伍cial is clean. A clean 0自cial r司ects all unacceptable applications 
and all bribes. This is ref1ected in the 0伍cial' s payoff ﹒∞ of accepting a bribe. 
Let mß denote the bribe the official will accept if the applicant is at nodeβ 
Then mß =∞. The 0伍cial accepts no bribe, however big. 
If the applicant is at node γ， the official may accept a bribe: at this node, the application is 
unacceptable but the official is corrupt. If the official rejects the bribe and application, he 
incurs no cost. In order for him to accept the bribe and application it must at least meet his 
cost of doing so, which is Dl. 
Let m'Y denote the bribe the official will accept if the applicant is at node y. 
Then m'Y這 D10 The minimum bribe the 0伍cial will accept is D10 
If the applicant is at node α， again the official may accept the bribe: at this node, the 
application is acceptable and the official is corrupt. In accepting the bribe and application, 
the corrupt official incurs a cost of B10 But at this node it is not costless for the official to 
reject the bribe and application: as the application is in fact acceptable, having required the 
applicant to revise and resubmit it is harassment of a qualified applicant, which carries a cost 
to the 0伍cial of A10 In choosing whether or not to accept a bribe at this node, the official 
takes into account that in rejecting it he is obliged to pay A10 This situation reduces (ioeo , 
合om Bl ) the bribe the 0伍cial requires in ord.ef to make it worth rus while to accept. 
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Letmαdenote the bribe the officia1 will accept if the applicant is at node α. 
Thenmα 注 Bl - Al' The minimum bribe the 0伍cial will accept is B 1 - Al' 
Further, as D1 > B1 > Ah then mY > mα21 This implies that, whether or not the application is 
in fact acceptable, a coπupt 0伍cial wiU accept any bribe greater than or equal to mY and 
reject any bribe less than mα﹒ 
Given the bribes specified above for different combinations of applica-ut and official 
types and moving up the game tree to the applicant's choice, if the applicant chooses to offer 
a bribe, which bribe 1iJill he offer? The applicant does not want to offer a bribe bigger than 
needed for the application to be accepted (e.g., mY if he is at node α) ， nor does he want to 
offer a bribe he expects will be rejected (e.g., any bribe if he is at node 戶 ormαifhe is at 
node y) 
Clearly, the bribe to offer (incIuding here no bribe, i.e. , a bribe of 0) depends on 
whether the applicant is at node α(acceptable appIication, corrupt officia1), node ß 
(unacceptable application, cIean official), or node y (unacceptable application, corrupt 
official). \Vhat are the respective probabilities of being at these nodes? They are not the 
product of the applicant's prior probabilities about the three combinations: by the time the 
applicant has reached these nodes, he has acquired information that allows him to update 
those priors -- he has learned that he has not submitted an acceptable appIication to a clean 
officiaI. 1 model the caIculation of these new probabilities as a Bayesian updating of priors, 
given rejection of the application in period 1. Let A denote an acceptable application, and A 
denote an unacceptable application. Let r denote rejection of the application in period 1. Let 
C denote a clean official, and C denote a corrupt 0伍ciaI.
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By Bayes' rule: p (A Ir) = p (A and r) 
p (r) 
Substituting the applicant's priors yields: p (A Ir) = Pl - Pl P2 
1 - Pl P2 
This is the probability of an acceptable application, given rejection in period 1. 
Sirnilarly, by Bayes' rule: P (C Ir) = P (C and r) 
p (r) 
Substituting the applicant's priors yields : p (C Ir) = P2 - Pl P2 
1 - Pl P2 
This is the probability of a clean official, given rejection in period 1. 
Again, by Bayes' rule: p (C Ir) = p (C and r) 
p (r) 
Substituting the applicant's priors yields : p (C Ir) = 1 - P2 
1 - Pl P2 
This is the probability of a corrupt official , given r貝jection in period 1 
These conditional probabilities can be used to compute the updated probabilities ofbeing at 
nodes α，戶， and y 
The applicant knows after rejection in period 1 that he has not submitted an 
.acceptable application to a clean 0伍cia1. Therefore, if the application is acceptable, given 
吋ection， the official must be corrupt. The probability of being at nodeαis simply the 
probability of having an acceptable application, given rejection in period 1: 
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p(α) = P (A Ir) = Pl - Pl P2 
可b
p 
--a DA ' •• A 
If the application is unacceptable, however, rejection in period 1 gives the applicant no 
information about the 0伍cial's type. The probability of being at node ß must take into 
account the probability that the application is unacceptable and the probability that the 
。伍cial is clean, with both probabilities given rejection in period 1: 
p (戶)=p(互 Ir) p (C Ir) 
And as p (互 Ir) = 1 - P (A Ir), then 






Similar1y, the probability of being at node y must take into account the probability that the 
application is unacceptable and the probability that the official is corru阱， both probabilities 
given rejection in period 1 









These updated priors 一 conditional probabilities of being at nodes α，戶， y, respectively, given 
rejection in period 1-- add up to 1 
Returning now to the question posed above, if the applicant chooses to 功是r a bribe, 
which bribe will he offer? The answer can be computed by comparing the expected payoff of 
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offering the minimum of mαwith the expected payoff of offering the minimum of m'T . (As 
the appropriate bribe at node ß is 0, this calculation is not relevant here.) Ifthe applicant 
chooses to offer a bribe, he will offer the bribe with the highest expected payoff (in this 
ana1ysis, the lowest expected cost). These expected values take into account the probabilities 
of being at nodes α，戶， and y and the cost of offering a bribe (mαorm可 at each of these 
nodes. For example, the calculation takes into account that ifthe applicant is at node 戶
(unacceptable application, clean 0伍cial) ， neither bribe wi l1 be accepted: the cost to the 
applicant wilI be A2 + C2, which is the cost of offering a bribe to a clean official plus the cost 
of revising and resubmitting (because the clean 0伍cial will r司 ect the bribe and not reverse 
the original rejection of the application) . It also takes into account that a bribe of mαis too 
small to be accepted at node y (unacceptable application, corrupt 0伍cial): the cost to the 
applicant of offering this bribe at node y is C2, the cost of revising and resubmitting (because 
the bribe is not big enough to be accepted, even though the official is corrupt). These 
expected costs are as follows : 
E (offering mU , the smaller bribe) = 
可
h
ny PA PA 
﹒口1α+
qh DA DA 唔，EA
P2 - 2 Pl P2 + P12 P2 
一﹒ (A2 + C2) + 
























E (offering m"f, the bigger bribe) = 
可
h




P2 - 2 Pl P2 + P12 P2 
一一一一一一﹒ (A2 + C2) + 
(1 - Pl P2)2 
1 - Pl - P2 + Pl P2 
一--------﹒ (m"f + B2) 
(1 - Pl P2)2 
1f an applicant chooses to bribe, he will offer the bribe with the lowest expected cost. That is: 
If E (offering mα) > E (offering mγ) ， the applicant offers m"f minimum; if E 
(offe丘ngm可> E (offering mα) ， he offers mαmlmmum. 
But wi!l the applicant choose 10 offer a bribe at all? He wiIl, ifthe cost ofnot 
offering a bribe (which is C2, the cost of revising and resubmitting the application) exceeds 
the expected cost associated with offering a bribe. That is: 
If E (offering mα) > E (offering m1) and C2 > E (offering mγ) ， the applicant 
offers minimum bribe mY• 
IfE (offering m可> E (offering mα) and C2 > E (offering mα) ， the applicant 
offers minimum bribe mα. 
But ifE (offering mα) > C2 and E (offeri時 m可> C2 , the applicant chooses C2 
(revise and resubmit, do not bribe).22 
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In sum, bribery is an equilibrium when C2 is greater than the expected cost of offering 
either the smaller bribe mαor the bigger bribe mr. And the equilibrium bribe is the bribe 
associated with the smaller of these two expected costs. When C2 is a smaller cost than the 
expected costs associated with offering either the larger or smaller bribe, then bribery is not 
an equilibrium solution: the applicant is better off to offer no bribe, but instead to respond to 
a rejection by revising and resubmitting the application. The conditions under which bribery 
is or is not an equilibrium (and, if an equilibrium, the equilibrium bribe size) depend, then, on 
the expected costs of offering mαand mγ(given in the formulas above) relative to the value of 
C2 and relative to each other. 
4.6.λTumerical Example. 
To illustrate the solution above, 1 offer a numerical example. 1 assign to game parameters 
some values that are consistent 'Nith the empirical account in section 3 and appear to me 
plausible. These base case values are presented in table 1. 1 assign a value of 0.4 to Ph the 
prior probability of submitting an acceptable application, and the same value to P2' the prior 
probability of encountering a clean officia1. Substituting the assigned values into the 
formulas above, 1 calculate the expected costs of offering mαand mY, respectively, and 
compare the lowest of these values with the cost of revising and resubmitting the 
application. 23 Results are as follows: E (offering mα) = 24.24; E (offering mY) = 24.16; the 
lowest of these (mY) is also lower than the cost of revising and resubmitting the application 
(C2 = 32). At these assigned values, bl幼ery is an equilibrium, and the equilibrium bribe is 
m~ the larger of the two bri bes. 24 
5. The Value of Personal Connections. 
The game presented above models the strategic interaction between a licensing official with 
perfect information and an applicant with imperfect information. Many entrepreneurs 
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interviewed altered this information asymmetry by ar-ranging transactions through personal 
connections. Personal conn的tions are relationships with a history that is prior to (and apart 
合om) the specific relationship defined by the formallicensing process: personal connections 
establish terms of familiarity between applicants and licensing officials. Personal 
connections include already established informal direct connections between applicants and 
officials who evaluate their applications and (more commonly) indirect connections through 
other parties. When applicants encounter licensing 0元cials as "familiar acquaintances" 
(shuren) , they expect the encounter to be different 企orL l. _Jt modeled in section 4 above. 
Specifically, they expect officials will do their best to help them and wiU certainly not 
attempt to deceive them. This does not come free of charge. Simply by activating personal 
connections, applicants begin the process of making payments or incurring obligations to 
make payments in the future. Payments are typically non-cash gifts or favors. They may be 
paid (or owed) to licensing officials directly or to other parties who act as middlemen, taking 
on reponsibility for payments to licensing officials. 
Put another way, choosing to exploit personal connections is equivalent to making a 
payment in some amount before starting the process of enterprise licensing. In retum for 
upfront payments, applicants get reliable information about their own types (i .e. , whether 
applications are acceptable or unacceptable) and about 0伍cials' types. Unlike bribes, 
however, these payments are not illicit (for applicants or officials): they are simply private 
compensation to acquaintances for reliable, non-confidential expertise. 25 
Why do some applicants choose to transact through personal connections? In the 
formulation above, the value to applicants of personal connections in the licensing process is 
the expected νa/ue of pelfect information, which transforms the signaling game in section 4 
above into a non-game. This expected value can be calculated and compared to the expected 
33 
Corruplion by Design 
value of the signaling game. Assuming that the latter value is larger, the difference between 
the two is the maximum amount applicants will pay (or commit to pay) as up企ont
"connection fees." 
As in the signaling game, 1 assume the application is acceptable or unacceptable, with 
respective prior probabilities of Pl and 1 - Pl' Similarly, 1 assume the official (now a familiar 
acquaintance) is clean or corrupt, with respective prior probabilities of P2 and 1 - P2' 1 
assume also that a connection fee is transacted prior to the interaction (described below) 
between applicant and 0伍cial
If the application is acceptable, the 0伍cial arranges for it t6 be accepted. Payo位 to
the applicant and the 0伍cial are O. Ifthe application is unacceptable, the official offers this 
information and the applicant offers a bribe in the amount of mY (the bigger bribe in the 
signaling game, covering Db the cost to a co汀upt official of accepting an unacceptable 
application). Payoffs depend on whether the official is clean or corrupt. A clean 0伍cial
rejects the bribe and makes no arrangements for the application to be accepted. The clean 
。伍cial has a payoff of 0; the applicant has a payoff of -C2, which re f1ects the cost of revising 
and resubmitting the application. That 芯， 1 assume here that a clean official is clean 
regardless of whether the applicant is a stranger or an acquaintance, but that there is no cost 
to the applicant associated with offering a bribe to a clean official if he is an acquaintance 
(i .e., no A2). A corrupt official accepts the bribe and arranges for the application to be 
accepted : the official has a payoff ofmY - D1; the applicant has a payoff of -m)'. 
To calculate the expected value of perfect information, 1 simply sum the probability 




Pl . 0 + (1 - Pl) P2 . C2 + [(1 - Pl) (1 - pJ] . Dl = 
(1 - Pl) P2 . C2 + [(1 - Pl) (1 - P2)] . Dl 
Substituting the base case parameter values yields 13.44 as the expected value of perfect 
information. 
What is the expected value of applying for a license without exploiting personal 
connections? It is the expected value of the licensing process with impe自ct infonnation, 
which is the expected value to the applicant of the signaling game. The analysis and 
numerical example in section 4 provides this expected value (i .e. , expected cost) conditional 
on rejection of the application in period 1. 1n choosing whether or not to exploit person叫
connections, however, the applicant is choosing between aIternatives before he begins the 
signaling game. The appropriate comparison, therefore, is the expected value ofthe entire 
signaling game (not only that pa口 of it conditional on rejection ofthe app1icatiön). This is 
the sum of two products : the probability of rejection in period 1 muItiplied by the expected 
value given r貝jection， and the probability of acceptance in period 1 multiplied by the 
expected value given acceptance. The expected value (i .e., expected cost) given rejection is 
the equiIibrium bribe mγcaIculated in section 4. And as the expected value to the applicant 
given acceptance is 0, the Iatter product is O. This means the expected value ofthe entire 
game is the equilib討um bribe mγmultipIied by the probability of r司ection in period 1: 
m'f (1 - PIP2) = 24.16 . [1 - (0 .4)(0 .4)] = 20.29 
Subtracting the expected value of personaI connections (13 .44) from this expected value 
yields 6.85 . This is the maximum amount applicants 叫11 pay as connection fees . Whether or 
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not applicants choose to exploit personal connections, then, depends on whether they can do 
so for no more than this amount. This can depend on the network of personal connections 
available to applicants: applicants may have a wide or narrow range of personal connections, 
and even applicants who are not generally welI-connected may have a fortuitous connection 
that serves them welI. (F or example, an appIicant whose former student or younger brother 
works as a licensing official evaluating applications is probably able to exploit this personal 
connection for very Iittle.) 
6. Comparative Statics: Policy Change and Corruption Control. 
Changes in economic policy orientation in 1992 produced important changes in enterprise 
licensing policy: a significant relaxation of standards defining acceptable applications and an 
increase in transparency in enterprise licensing. These changes are changes in institutional 
design. Ongoing efforts to control bureaucratic corruption through increased enforcement 
and educational campaigns can also a1ter institutional design. Changes in design can be 
analyzed as changes in base case parameter values for the signaling game in section 4. 
A1 tering the values assigned to game parameters a1ters the numerical results. It does 
not necessarily a1ter the substantive resu1t ofbribery as an equilibrium or the equilib討um
bigger bribe size. This section examines the robustness of these substantive equilibria when 
parameter values are different. The varying parameter values in the comparative statics 
exercises below re f1 ect empirical variation in the institutionaI design of enterprise licensing. 
6.1 . Changes in Policy. 
In spring 1992 Deng Xiaoping gave widely publicized suppo吋 to rapid economic growth and 
market forces in a series oftalks during a tour ofthe economicalIy advanced south (see Deng 
18 Jan.-21 Feb. 1992). This orientation to the "sociaIist market economy" was endorsed at a 
meeting convened by the Central Committee in June and again, formaIIy as policy, at the 
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14th Party Congress in October. The SAIC responded quickly and unambiguously to Deng's 
message in a document calling for a major reduction in the number of approvals and pem世ts
required prior to licensing. Requirements "beneficial to economic development" were to be 
kept in place; others were to be gradually invalidated (SAlC 5 June 1992; see also Liu 1993) 
The SAlC document was aimed mainly at encroachments by government economic 
departments, which over the years had used approval and permit authority to restrict entry 
(and, thereby, competition) in order to maintain state enterprise monopolies in their 
respective trades and industrial sectors (see especialIy Fang 1992). To suppo口 these
monopolies, economic departments had increased the number of permits required and had set 
up an examination and approval process that was a "virtual labyrinth" for applicants outside 
the state enterprises directly under the departments: "Applicants have no iqea where they will 
collide into a wall, no way to predict what will happen" (Fang 1992:63). A: _deputy head of 
the SAlC noted that private enterprises in 戶口icular faced "a forest of checkpoints in the 
examination and approval process" (Gan 1993: 15). Predictably, given the implicit chaIlenge 
to powerful bureaucratic interests, the process of actually invalidating specific national and 
local stipulations to ref1ect the SAIC policy guidelines was (and continues to be) fai rIy 
slow. 26 
Despite the slow pace of change for 0伍cial standards, local bureaus of industry and 
commerce throughout the country responded quickly with significantly relaxed operative 
standards for enterprise licensing (see, e.g. , Wan 1992; Cao 1993; Sun 1993). Obviously, 
however, if standards defining acceptable applications are relaxed, but applicants have no 
more information than before, applicants wiIl underestimate the probability that their 
applications are acceptable. Leaders of locallicensing offices described this situation as a 
lack oftransparency (toumingdu) in enterprise licensing. To address this problem, bureaus of 
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industry and commerce renewed earlier efforts (see SAIC 23 July 1988, 20 Mar. 1990) to 
make the new standards public. Licensing 0伍ces set up bulletin boards, displayed wa11 
posters, and printed book1ets out1ining conditions for acceptable applications, procedures, 
time restrictions, documentary evidence requirements, and fees. All of these methods 
communicated standards through channels other than licensing 0伍cials themselves. 
Some leaders of Iocallicensing offices characterized these increases in transparency 
as anti-corruption measures: by this logic, if an acceptable appIication is easier to prepare 
than applicants previously imagined, and if applicants know what constitutes an acceptable 
appIication, then they are more likely to know when officials misrepresent the status of 
acceptable applications. 
These changes in poIicy can be represented as changes in parameter values in the 
signaIing game. The effect of relaxation of standards can be analyzed by reducing the cost of 
revising and resubmitting applications (C2) from the base case value of 32. The combined 
effect of relaxation of standards and increased transparency can be analyzed by increasing 
appIicants' priors for acceptable applications (Pl) from the base case value of 0 .4. ResuIts of 
these exercises in comparative statics are presented in figures 2 and 3. 
Figure 2 ilIustrates expected values for offering the smalIer and bigger bribes and the 
cost of revising and resubmitting appIications when that cost (C2) varies. As expected valu es 
are expected costs, equilibria are the Iowest (not highest) values . Holding other base case 
values constant and reducing the cost of revising and resubmitting applications by only a very 
smalI amount (i .e., from the base case value of32) shifts the equilibrium from the bigger to 
the smalIer bribe. This is a fai rIy robust equilibrium: further reductions in C2 do not affect 
the smalIer bribe equiIibrium untiI C2 reaches the extremely smaIl value (i .e. , relative to base 
case values) of about 4. At that point, the equilibrium shifts from bribery to revising and 
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resubmitting the application. This value (comparable to the base case cost of offering a bribe 
to a c1ean 0伍cial) is much too small to reflect the current situation in enterprise licensing. 
Nor, in my understanding, is this value big enough to reflect a fu心re in which all approvals 
and permits 企om government economic departments have been eliminated in practice.27 
Figure 3 ilIustrates expected values for offering the smalIer and bigger bribes and the 
(here unvarying) cost of revising and resubmitting applications when applicants' estimated 
priors for acceptable applications (Pl) are changed. Increasing these priors reflects the 
simu1taneous relaxation of standards and transparency in enterprise licensing (which 
increases applicants' knowledge of these standards). Considering that transparency is viewed 
as an anti-corruption measure, the resu1t of the comparative statics exercise is quite 
interesting. Holding other base case values constant, increasing priors for acceptable 
applications reduces expected costs for each ofthe bribes. Not only is the substantive 
equilibrium of bribery unchanged, but also bribery becomes an increasingly more attractive 
choice for the applicant as the gap widens between the expected cost of the lowest bribe and 
the cost of revising and resubmitting the application. Transparency does reduce corruption in 
one non-trivial sense: with only a very small increase (from the base case value) in priors for 
acceptable applications, the equiIibrium bribe becomes the smaller (instead of the bigger) 
bribe. Somewhat counter-intuitively, this equilibrium is extremely robust: holding other 
values constant, the greater the applicant's estimated likelihood that his application is 
acceptable, the more attractive the choice to offer the (smalIer) bribe. 
6.2. Efforts 10 Control Corruption. 
Since 1982 the Chinese government has engaged in an ongoing battle to control corruption in 
its various forms , including bureaucratic corruption of the form analyzed here. Local bureaus 
of industry and commerce have fo lIowed SAIC directives to launch periodic campaigns and 
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implement more routine anti-corruption measures. At the first nationwide SAIC meeting on 
IIbuilding cIean government," the SAIC head identified ideologicaI (i.e. , mora1) education as 
the crux of efforts to control corruption (Liu 1990). This approach focuses directly on 
changing the character of officials by increasing the psychic costs of corruption. It assumes 
that officials engage in corrupt actions because they have coπupt natures, which can be 
modified through moral suasion. ldeological education campaigns are nearly always part of 
major national anti-corruption campaigns, which are launched with fanfare every few years 
and reported prominently in the media. 
The SAIC has not, however, completely ignored a different approach to corruption 
control: modifying the structure of incentives within wruch 0伍cials act. In particular, local 
bureaus of industry and commerce have made attempts to increase the costs of bribery to 
officials. They have tried to strengthen detection by encouraging cIients of the bureaus to 
repo口 officials who abuse public office, and they have periodically (usually during 
campaigns) increased pena1ties for bribery (see, e.g., SAIC, Investigation Group 1986; Hunan 
Province, Hengyang Municipal Bureau of Industry and Commerce, Office of Supervision 
These two different approaches to the control of corruption can be represented as 
changes in parameter values in the signaling game. The effect of increasing the costs of 
bribery to 0伍cials can be analyzed by increasing either the cost of accepting a bribe 丘om a 
qualified applicant (B 1) or that of accepting a bribe from an unqualified applicant (D 1) 
Because the latter is considerably easier to implement (especially through increasing 
pena1ties) than the former, 1 analyze the effect of increasing Dl from the base case value of 
16. 28 Resu1ts are presented in figure 4. 
Holding other base case values constant, increasing by a small amount the cost to 
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o伍cia1 s of accepting bribes from unqualified applicants changes the equil.ibrium in the 
signa1ing game 企om the bigger to the sma11er bribe. Moreover, this new equilibrium is 
extremely robust: changes in D} increase the expected cost ofthe bigger bribe, but not ofthe 
smaller bribe; as a resu1t, the smaller bribe becomes increasingly attractive to the applicant. 
There is no parameter in the signaling game for analysis of the direct effect of 
ideological education campaigns. lf such campaigns do succeed in changing preferences of 
。伍cials by increasing the psychic costs ofbribery to them, this implies an increase in the 
number of clean officials. Unquestionably, this will reduce corruption. ln terms of the 
signaling game in section 4, a greater number of acceptable applications will be accepted in 
period 1, and a greater number of appIicants wilI not have to choose between bribery and 
revising and resubmitting applications. 
Here 1 consider some secondary effects of anti-corruption campaigns. 1 assume that 
the publicity accompanying campaigns affects applicants' beliefs about behavioral norms in 
the bureaucracy. This allows me to analyze effects of anti-corruption campaigns as changes 
in applicants' priors about encountering clean 0伍cials. Resu1ts are presented in figure 5. 
Consider first the equilibrium for values of P2 above the base case value of 0.4. 
Holding other base case values constant, increasing applicants' priors for encountering clean 
o伍cials increases expected costs associated with each of the bribes. Bribery continues to be 
the equilibrium (and the equilibrium bribe continues to be the bigger bribe) up to the point 
where applicants' priors reach about 0.85. At that point, bribery ceases to be an equilibrium 
soIution: the expected cost of offering either the bigger or smaIIer bribe exceeds the cost of 
revising and resubmitting the application. The new equilibrium is revision and resubmission 
ofthe application (without bribery). 
ln short, quite independent of any possible direct effect of increasing the number of 
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clean 0伍cials， anti-corruption campaigns may change applicants' priors about the character 
of licensing officials, which may in turn produce a change in the enterprise licensing 
equilibrium: if applicants believe the proportion of clean 0伍cials is high enough, they will 
not offer bribes after their applications are rejected in period 1. 1n the longer term, if 
applicants cease to offer bribes, then the "always reject" strategy of corrupt 。但cials in period 
1 is no Ionger optimal for them. 
Now consider a different possibility: the publicity associated with anti-corruption 
campaigns may have the exact opposite e丘ect on applicants' priors. The campaigns may lead 
applicants to conclude that licensing offices are teeming with co汀upt 0伍ciaIs. This 
secondary effect is aIso re f1ected in figure 5 一 in those values of P2 below the base case 
value. 1nteresting旬， however, a decrease in values of P2 has anti-corruption benefits too: 
when applicants believe the proportion of cIean officiaIs is low enough (at about 0.3) , the 
equilibrium bribe size switches from the bigger to the smalIer bribe 
7. ConcI usion. 
The exercises in comparative statics indicate that corruption of the form analyzed here is 
quite robust. 1t appears to be relatively unproblematic to reduce corruption, in the sense of 
reducing bribe sizes. lndeed , policy measures and anti-corruption efforts recently adopted 
can be expected to have had this effect already. To move away entirely from cor刊pt
equilibria, however, requires far more dramatic change in institutional design. 
The exercises suggest that even major changes in structures may be ineffective in 
eliminating corruption entirely. Changes in expectations may be effective, but they must be 
very substantial, if they are to achieve this end. Yet, this poses a problem: leaders strongly 
committed to eliminating co汀uption can rearrange structures to do so, even in an 
environment where corruption is pervasive (see Klitgaard 1988); changes in beIiefs, however, 
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cannot be similarly mandated 企om above, but can only be encouraged to emerge 企om below 
(see Manion 1993). 
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1. The SAIC also carries out a number of other supervisory and regulatory duties in the 
economy. It drafts laws and regulations on the administration of industry and commerce, 
manages trade at rural and urban markets, admi凶strates markets for capital goods and sc訂ce
commodities, coordinates and implements investigation and punishment of illegal economic 
activities, studies and monitors the development of the private economy, manages advertising 
and the use of trademarks, oversees the administration of economic contracts, and acts as 
arbiter in economic contractual disputes. These duties are becoming more important as direct 
control of the economy through central planning is gradually replaced by indirect regulation 
of the "sociaIist market economy." 
2. Others are: taxation, customs, public security, and the judiciary. 
3. These issue are relevant, ho\vever, in the determination of pena1ties (see section 3.4 
below). 
4. There has been 0伍cial debate on the appropriate size of the private economy, which 
may have implications for limiting the number of private enterprises. The SAIC journal 
reported a suggestion (by noted economist Li Yining) of 30 percent as an appropriate limit on 
the size of the private economy, but no 0伍cial standard has been adopted (" Siying jingji de 
bili xiangding" 1989). 
5. These documents are reproduced in published collections (see SAIC, Bureau of 
Enterprise Licensing 1985, 1988, 1989; SAIC, Legal Bureau 1991 , 1992; Gongshang 
xingzheng guanli xianxing youxiao guizhang huibian ρ979.1-1991.12) 1992. New 
documents are reproduced in the journal Gongshang xingzheng guanli. 
Corruption by D臼ign
6. See the discussion in section 6.1 below. 
7. Collections of documents on enterprise licensing are sold at the publishing outlet, 
but not at bookstores; some collections are classified as intemal (neibu); and keeping up to 
date on changing stipulations requires reading the SAIC joumal and joumals ofprovincial 
bureaus of industry and commerce. Neither the SAIC joumal nor the provincial joumals are 
widely available, and the SAIC joumal and some ofthe provincial joumals are classified as 
intema1. 
8. This assumes that investigations and verification (or post-licensing inspections) are 
independent 企om initial decisions to accept applications. At one licensing office 1 visited, 
。伍cials work in pairs: each 0伍cial responsible for evaluation is assigned a permanent 
pa口ner to investigate and verify the materials for applications he accepts. This arrangement 
can facilitate cooperation in corruption 
9. Applicants can submit to a formal administrative appeals process, but they are 
unlikely to do so and unlikely to succeed if they do so. See section 3.3 below. 
10. 1 note here that in the game theoretic analysis of section 4, 1 simplify by assuming 
that costs of operating without a license are high enough that applicants will make attempts to 
obtain one. 1n reality, this is not always so. The SAIC journal has reported cases of 
enterprises going unlicensed because of delays and difficulties in obtaining permits 企om
government economic departments (see，呵， Lan and Lian 1991; Yuan and Zhang 1993). At 
one municipal district licensing 0伍ce 1 visited, 0伍cials estimated that small businesses 
easily operate unlicensed without being detected by their officiaIs, but that they usualIy can 
detect larger enterprises operating unlicensed (Licensing Office Interview 93084). 1n rural 
localities, larger enterprises are likely to experience even greater difficulties in avoiding 
detection if they operate unlicensed. 
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11. 1 have seen no evidence that such penalties are in fact imposed. 
12. 1 have encountered no cases of applicants serving prison tenns or tenns of forced 
labor simply for bribery in enterprise licensing. 
13. Some officials have suggested that low salaries account for the corruption, a view 
rejected by the SAIC head: acknowledging the low salaries, he argued nonetheless that 
ideological education is the crux ofbuilding clean government (Liu 1990). j 
14. The corrupt 0伍cial in this game is passive. 1 note here that a more active fonn of 
corruption, solicitation of bribes, is not only more cost1y to the 0伍cial (pena1ties if detected 
are higher; probability of dectection is probably higher) but also unnecessary: the analysis 
below concludes that, for parameter values chosen to reflect the institutional design described 
in section 3, the applicant's optimal strategy when the application is rejected is to offer a 
bribe 
15 . 1n the analysis that follows , 1 initially assume a strategy "always reject" for the 
coπupt officia1. This strategy tums out to be optimal for the co汀upt official for assigned 
base case parameter values. Moreover, bribery proves to be a fairly robust equilibrium when 
parameter values are altered in section 6 
16. The game form presented in figure 1 simplifies in representing this: the obligation 
to accept a revised application is reflected in the payoff structure; after aIl ~'revise and 
resubmit" branches, payo位 assume the official can only accept the application. 
17. Again, the representation ofthis in the game form presented in fi忽lre 1 simplifies 
by assurning this in the payoff structure. 
18. Note that 1 assume here that the applicant pays no cost of offering a bribe to a 
corrupt officia1. But we can easily conceive (and somewhat less easily mode1) that corrupt 
o伍cials may report offers of bribes from applicants with unacceptable applications --
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especially during anti-corruption campaigns and when these bribe offers are too small to 
cover expected costs associated with accepting them. 
19. That 尬， 1 assume here that an 0伍cial who accepts a bribe and application 企oma
qualified applicant (after r貝jecting that applicant's application in period 1) pays a cost ofB} 
but not an additional cost of Al. 
20. That is, 1 assume here that an 0伍cial who accepts a bribe and application from an 
unqualified applicant pays a cost ofD1 but not an additional cost ofC1. 
21. Note that this formulation of bribe size in terms of 0伍cial's costs is consistent 
with the relationship between bribe size and severity of penalties discussed in section 3.4 
above. 
22. 1 note here that mαminimum and mY minimum were defined in terms that make 
the 0伍cial precisely indifferent between accepting and rejecting the bribe and application. 
Therefore, in those conditions in which the appIicant offers a bribe, he offers the minimum 
bribe +εso that the official is not indifferent between acceptance and rejection. For 
simplification in the text, 1 have not incIuded this epsilon amount. 
23. RecalI that mαand mY have been defined in terms of parameter values, as Bl - Al 
and Dl' respectively. 
24. The two expected costs are very cIose in value. Comparative statics exercises in 
section 6 indicate that the equilibrium at base case values is cIose to a "switchpoint": small 
changes in parameter values push the equilibrium to an increasingly robust smalIer bribe 
equilibrium or bigger bribe equilibrium, depending on the direction of parameter change. 
Judging from interviews, 1 would guess the smalIer bribe is the equilibrium (i .e., applicants 
commonly pay officiaIs a private fee for doing their job but not the larger amount for illicit 
services) 
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25. Some en甘eprene叮s interviewed in Beijing commented that, in their experience, 
transacting through personal connections \vas less common in highly marketized areas, such 
as Guangzhou, compared to Beijing. 
26. In 1993 the SAIC circulated a document that identified simplification of licensing 
requirements as a m句or focus of SAIC \vork for that year. It condemned the existing 
examination and approval system as "a product and prop of the planned ecönomy" (SAlC 20 
Feb. 1993). As recently as June 1994 Vice Premier Zhu Rongji criticized government 
economic departments for their abuse of approval and pennit authority, indicating that the 
problem had yet to be resolved. Zhu reiterated the call for simplification of licensing 
requirements (Foreign Broadcast Infonnation Service 13 June 1994:20-21). 
27. Even under the boldest plans set out by SAlC policy lnakers, ente中討se licenses 
\vill be required to meet SOlne standards that involve other govemment departments 
(regulating areas such as environmental polIution, public health, and labor and personnel) and 
involve some real cost of revising and resubmitting applications. For coπupt officials who 
create costs of revising and resubmitting applications that are in fact acceptable, this small 
value can 1ikely be met by overly bureaucratic requirements offonn alone. 
28. Procedures are unlikely to detect bribery associated \vÏ th acceptablic applications, 
as such applications raise no suspicions \vhen investigated, verified, approval , or inspected. 
Licensing offices could relatively easily raise the cost of accepting unacceptable applications 
(C 1) , treating the action of al10wing an unqualified applicant to get through as sufficient or 
strong evidence ofbribery. But this might also increase the proportion of acceptable 
applications rejected by c1 ean officials, \vho act cautiously to avoid any stigma associated 
with suspicion ofbribery. Increasing D} has none ofthese counter-productive results. 
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